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Criminal Fair Trial Rights by Ryan Goss represents an important and timely 
contribution to the literature on the most litigated provision of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),1 Article 6. Unlike many of 
the leading texts on fair trial rights under the ECHR, which undertake a 
right-by-right analysis,2 Goss takes a refreshing issue-based approach to 
determine the extent to which the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) on Article 6 is consistent, predictable, clear and 
stable. He ultimately concludes that there is significant incoherence in the 
ECtHR’s approach(es) to questions such as the identification of implied 
rights, the interpretation of Article 6, its own role in relation to Article 6, 
and the assessment of breaches.  
 
In Part A of the book, Goss discusses the interpretative techniques used by 
the ECtHR, and finds considerable inconsistency in the way that the Court 
uses extrinsic documents and avoids literal interpretation (pp 15-34). One 
particularly interesting nugget point that arises from this Part is that the 
ECtHR’s use of the ‘object and purpose’ of Article 6 is somewhat confused. 
On occasion, it is invoked without explanation as to why recourse to a 
teleological approach is warranted, and, perhaps more worryingly, the 
ECtHR has, on occasion, made reference to the underlying purpose of a 
provision without explicitly stating what that purpose was (p 20). 
 
Another important contribution appears in Ppart B, where Goss analyses 
the Court’s position under the so-called ‘fourth instance doctrine’, which 
determines that its role should not be as a further court of appeal for 
national decisions. Goss determines that this rule is not as clear-cut as 
commonly assumed, with reference to a number of exceptions to the 
doctrine enunciated in the case law of the ECtHR. He highlights a number of 
fascinating examples where the ECtHR clearly did undertake its own 
analysis of the factual and legal findings reached by the domestic court (p 
50-51).3  
 
Part C discusses the ECtHR’s interpretation of the internal structure of 
Article 6 – that is, whether the minimum guarantees enunciated in Article 
6(3) are to be properly understood as elements or specific aspects of the 
general right to a fair and public hearing under Article 6(1), and, if so, how 
should alleged violations of both Articles 6(1) and 6(3) should be assessed? 
This is perhaps the section of the book where Goss is at his most 
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prescriptive – in other parts, he categorically refuses to suggest a route for 
the ECtHR’s future practice or to draw normative conclusions on the 
ECtHR’s judgments, which some readers may find frustrating. 4  For 
example, in the discussion of ‘dogs that did not bark’ – implied rights that 
were not recognised by the ECtHR – Goss explicitly refuses to be drawn on 
whether the Court’s decisions were correct (p 104-105). By contrast, in 
Part C, Goss explicitly advocates a return to the approach taken by the 
European Commission in Nielsen v Denmark, where it considered that 
Articles 6(2) and 6(3) provided specific essential elements of the general 
notion of a fair trial, and that it would still be possible to find that Article 6 
had been violated, even where those minimum elements had been 
respected (p 86-87).5 This approach would require the Court to consider, 
first, whether there have been any specific violations of Article 6(2) or 
Article 6(3), and only if that question is answered in the negative will 
would the Court consider whether the trial as a whole was unfair. 
 
This point relates closely to Part E of Criminal Fair Trial Rights, which Goss 
describes as ‘the heart of this book’ (p 115). A particularly important 
section of Part E deals with the ‘proceedings as a whole’ test, where the 
author shows that this test has been applied inconsistently and 
ambiguously. Akin to the other sections in the book, Goss concludes that 
the ECtHR’s approach is too unclear to provide sufficient guidance, stating 
that ‘irrational flexibility means that the Court can approach an individual 
application in an unpredictable multitude of ways’ (p 206), leaving 
potential applicants uncertain as to the probable success of their claim. The 
author’s future work could perhaps assess the impact of the ECtHR’s 
incoherence in the interpretation of its rulings by national courtsin 
domestic jurisdictions in practice, or how the ambiguity of some of the 
standards laid down by the Court has allowed Article 6 case law to be mis-
applied or even abused in other contexts.6 
 
Criticisms of the book can be limited to two relatively minor points. The 
first is stylistic: some readers may find the signposting, whereby each 
chapter tells us what each section will argue and each section in turn 
begins by telling us again what that section will argue, somewhat 
superfluous. Moreover, perhaps, given that a large theme of the book is 
consistency, the footnoting style is remarkably inconsistent – sometimes 
authors’ full names are given, in other places, the author’s first initial only 
is used, and there does not appear to be a clear rule in place for this. These 
minor points could be easily remedied in future editions of the book.  
 
The second potential criticism is that readers might find some of the 
arguments slightly pedantic. Some aspects, which judges may regard as 
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mere rhetorical flourishes, such as emphasising ‘the prominent place held 
in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial’,7 are criticised for not 
being more explicit as to why the fair trial holds an important place in a 
democratic society, and what impact this prominent position has on the 
interpretation of Article 6 (p 30-34). The author’s argument in this regard 
might have been strengthened in pointing to real impacts of this approach.  
 
Overall, this book will be a welcome addition to the bookshelves of public 
international law and human rights scholars and practitioners. Its 
conclusions will likely cause these individuals, as well as national and other 
international institutions, to rethink the true meaning and value of ECtHR 
case law when incorporating and interpreting various ECHR concepts such 
as the ‘proceedings as a whole’ test and the ‘fourth instance doctrine’, given 
the problems of incoherence that Goss has cogently identified. 
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